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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-1553 
 ___________ 
 
 JULIO ALBERTO GARCIA VASQUEZ, 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
     Respondent 
 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A073-638-752) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Henry S. Dogin  
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 2, 2011 
 
 Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed March 3, 2011) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Before us is a petition for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“BIA”) affirming the denial of Petitioner‟s application for cancellation of removal.  We 
conclude that we lack jurisdiction to consider Petitioner‟s challenge to the agency‟s 
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discretionary determination regarding his claim of hardship. 
I. 
 Julio Alberto Garcia Vasquez, a native and citizen of Guatemala, entered the  
United States without inspection in 1994.  Vasquez conceded removability in a hearing 
before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) in 2008, but sought cancellation of removal based on 
hardship to his young son.  He testified that he supported the boy and the boy‟s mother, 
who are both United States citizens.  Administrative Record (“AR”) at 142-43.  He also 
testified that the child‟s mother worked full-time, his son was in good health, the boy‟s 
maternal grandmother helped care for him, and his son would remain with his mother in 
the United States if Vasquez were removed to Guatemala.  AR at 146-51.  The IJ denied 
the request for cancellation of removal, concluding that Vasquez had not met “anything 
remotely resembling the standard of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.”  AR at 
92.  Although he acknowledged the emotional hardship of leaving a son behind, the IJ 
noted that that was not enough to meet the standard.  AR at 93.  The BIA affirmed this 
decision, and Vasquez filed a timely petition for review.  On appeal, Vasquez challenges 
the IJ‟s hardship determination. 
II. 
 An alien who is removable from the United States is eligible for cancellation of 
removal if he can show, among other things, “that removal would result in exceptional 
and extremely unusual hardship to the alien‟s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of 
the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.”  8 U.S.C.  
3 
 
§ 1229b(b)(1)(D).  In this case, the IJ determined that Vasquez failed to establish 
“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to his young son.  We do not have 
jurisdiction to review certain discretionary decisions under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).  This includes the decision whether an 
alien meets the hardship requirement in § 1229b.  See Mendez-Moranchel v. Ashcroft, 
338 F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 2003).  We may, however, review “constitutional claims or 
questions of law.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).  Vasquez contends that his appeal is based 
on questions of law.  We disagree. 
 Vasquez claims that the IJ‟s decision deprives his son “of his due process and 
constitutional rights to receive medical and special services because of his hearing 
problems.”  Pet. Br. at 4.  But he presents no argument or legal authority in support of 
this claim.  The assertion of a due process violation, standing alone, is insubstantial and 
does not amount to a colorable constitutional claim.  See Pareja v. Att‟y Gen., 615 F.3d 
180, 186 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining that jurisdiction under § 1252(a)(2)(D) is limited to 
“colorable” claims, and that a claim is not colorable if it is “wholly insubstantial and 
frivolous”).  As we have stated, “a party may not dress up a claim with legal clothing to 
invoke this Court‟s jurisdiction.”  Id. at 187.  Furthermore, there is no basis in the record 
for this claim.  Although his brief states that Vasquez based his cancellation of removal 
application on his son Michael‟s hearing problems and provided supporting 
documentation, Pet. Br. at 2, there is no documentation for the claim in the record and no 
testimony regarding hearing problems.  On the contrary, Vasquez testified that his son – 
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named Jeffrey, not Michael – was in good health.  Therefore, the claim appears to be 
wholly insubstantial and frivolous, and we lack jurisdiction to review it. 
 Vasquez also claims that the IJ failed to follow BIA precedent when conducting 
the hardship evaluation because he failed to consider the hardship factors in the 
aggregate.  Pet. Br. at 4-6.  He further argues that the IJ engaged in mere speculation 
when he concluded that the loss of economic support from Vasquez would be offset by 
the mother‟s return to the workforce after she completed her education.  Id. at 6.  
Although Vasquez asserts that the IJ misapplied a legal standard, his claim actually 
challenges the weight the IJ accorded the economic hardship factor.  We have previously 
held that claims like these, i.e., claims that an IJ ignored factors or failed to evaluate them 
in the aggregate, do not raise questions of law and “amount to nothing more than 
„quarrels over the exercise of discretion.‟”  See Cospito v. Att‟y Gen., 539 F.3d 166, 170 
(3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).  Because Vasquez‟ claim involves only the IJ‟s 
discretionary decision regarding hardship, we do not have jurisdiction to review it. 
 Finally, we note that Vasquez did not raise on appeal to the BIA his due process 
claim or his claim that the IJ failed to consider the hardship factors in the aggregate.  This 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies is yet another basis for finding that we lack 
jurisdiction to review Vasquez‟ petition.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Abdulrahman v. 
Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 594-95 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 Accordingly, we will dismiss Vasquez‟ petition for review.  
